Remotely keyed encryption schemes (RKESs), introduced by Blaze [2 , cations (su CL support high-bandwidth cryptographic apphas encrypted video conferences) in which longlived secrets (such as users' private keys) never leave lowerbandwidth environments such as secure smart-cards. We provide a formal framework in which to study the security of RKESs and drive RKESs that satisfv our formal securitv requirements. 6ur RKESs are efficient-in that the amoundof communication and computation required of the smart-card is independent of the input size. In one proof of security, we use the pseudorandom permutation framework of Naor and Reingold [s] in an essential way.
Introduction
No cryptographic protocol is stronger than the mechanism protecting its secret keys. However, in many computing and communication systems, there is no "safe place" in which secret keys can be stored and cryptographic computations can be performed. This is especially true of modem networked computers; in some sense, every computer that communicates extensively with the world is bound at some point to be partly controlled by an uufriendly entity. Therefore, it is natural to consider adding an external, special-purpose device, such as a smart-card or a PCMCIA card, for storing cryptographic keys and computing cryptographic ftmctio& (See Figure 1 .) Because they have only one nurnose and oommu&ate c&y via a limiter set of fu&tions,su& devices can be made much more secure than their general-purpose host machines. Furthermore, the difficulty and expense of designing and building a special-purpose device can be justified, because the device could be used in a wide variety of cryptographic protocols in all networked computers. Unfortunately, it is not always practical to reIy on such devices to perform all sensitive cryptographic operations. Inexpensive smart-cards, for example, have limited bandwidth, memory, and processor speed. If the host computer used such devices simple-mindedly, by just encrypting all external communication and ail disk traffic, then the bandwidth of the link between the host and the cryptographic module would have to be at least as high as that between the host and the outside world.
Even"if the engineering problems of developing inexpensive, high-bandwidth, highperformance cryptographic modules were completely solved, ' it would still be the case that, whenever the host's link to the outside world was upgraded, the modules and the secret keys they store would have to be changed, because cryptographic modules are typically designed never to reveal their keys.
This paper provides a formal treatment of the remotely keyed encryption problem: how to do bulk encryption and decryption for high-bandwidth applications in a way that takes advantage of both the superior power of the host and the superior security of the smart-card?
If adversary A takes control of the host for a certain period, then clearly A will obtain whatever plaintext or ciphertext is resident in the host during that period. We would like to say formally that this is all it obtains: Once A loses control of the host, it cannot compute anything that it couldn't compute before it took control, except for the values it obtained explicitly while it was in control.
Blase 21 initiated the topic of "remotely keyed encryptionn and c, ucks [S] made the first attempt to state formal security properties that a remotely keyed encryption scheme should satisfy. In this paper, we give new formal definitions of "security" for RKESs, after explaining why Lucks's formalism is flawed. We also give specific RKESs that satisfy our definitions. One of our schemes produces ciphertext of exactly the same length as the corresponding plaintext, and one produces ciphertext that is slightly longer. The lengthpreserving scheme has the advantage of allowing applications to adhere to strict formatting requirements, s&h as may be imposed on the encryption of disk traffic or data nackets, while the length-in&easing scheme has the advantage of satisfying a more stringent definition of security. Both of our RKESs have the desirable property that, for any input length, the amount of communication and computation that they require of the smart-card is independent of the input size.
Two novel technical points of our definitions and protocols are:
(1) We manage to incorporate the basic cryptographic notion of "pseudorandomness" into our definitions of secu-S869 rity, despite the fact that a &sting&her would obviously be able to distinguish the encryption function from a random function if it could learn the (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs that were computed while an adversary controlled the host.
(2) The proof of security of our length-preserving protocol uses the pseudorandom permutation framework of Naor and Reingold [S] in an essential way.
A Secure Length-Preserving RKES
We state the length-preserving protocol here; a complete proof of its security can be found in [3] . First we fix notation. Definitions of standard cryptographic terms can be found in, e.g., Luby's monograph [4] . = Xj. The security property required of Es(.) is that it should be a strong pseudorandom permutation, i.e.., that any probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary gven access to Es(e) and Ds(.) cannot distinguish them from a truly random permutation and its inverse. l A pseudorandom junction Fs : {O,l}' c) (0, l}b; it may or may not be identical to the encryption function E of the block cipher. We use Fs, rather than Es, in situations that never require the function to be inverted. zhe;ecurity requirement for Gs is that, for any X,,, if S 1s chosen umformly at random, thr& 'd;$, , . . . , Xn) is pseudorandom (i.e., that a nrobabilistic.
nolvnomial-time machine cannot distin-'guish it from \ &ndom string of similar length). We impose a similar requirement on G;s. Possible realizations of Gs are: "Collision-intractability" means that it is computationally infeasible to find distinct X and X' such that H(X) = H(X'). Card --f Host: Xr
